In this paper, we consider the problem of distributed Bayesian detection in the presence of Byzantines in the network. It is assumed that a fraction of the nodes in the network are compromised and reprogrammed by an adversary to transmit false information to the fusion center (FC) to degrade detection performance. The problem of distributed detection is formulated as a binary hypothesis test at the FC based on 1-bit data sent by the sensors. The expression for minimum attacking power required by the Byzantines to blind the FC is obtained. More specifically, we show that above a certain fraction of Byzantine attackers in the network, the detection scheme becomes completely incapable of utilizing the sensor data for detection. We analyze the problem under different attacking scenarios and derive results for both asymptotic and non-asymptotic cases. It is found that asymptotics-based results do not hold under several non-asymptotic scenarios. When the fraction of Byzantines is not sufficient to blind the FC, we also provide closed form expressions for the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines that most degrade the detection performance.
1-bit local decision regarding the presence of a phenomenon before sending it to the fusion center (FC). Based on the local decisions transmitted by the nodes, the FC makes a global decision about the presence of the phenomenon of interest. Distributed detection was originally motivated by its applications in military surveillance but is now being employed in a wide variety of applications such as distributed spectrum sensing (DSS) using cognitive radio networks (CRNs) and traffic and environment monitoring.
In many applications, a large number of inexpensive and less reliable nodes that can provide dense coverage are used to provide a balance between cost and functionality. The performance of such systems strongly depends on the reliability of the nodes in the network. The robustness of distributed detection systems against attacks is of utmost importance. The distributed nature of such systems makes them quite vulnerable to different types of attacks. In recent years, security issues of such distributed networks are increasingly being studied within the networking [4] , signal processing [5] and information theory communities [6] . One typical attack on such networks is a Byzantine attack. While Byzantine attacks (originally proposed by [7] ) may, in general, refer to many types of malicious behavior; our focus in this paper is on data-falsification attacks [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . In this type of attack, an attacker may send false (erroneous) data to the FC to degrade detection performance. In this paper, we refer to such a data falsification attacker as a Byzantine and the data thus generated is referred to as Byzantine data.
We formulate the signal detection problem as a binary hypothesis testing problem with the two hypotheses H 0 (signal is absent) and H 1 (signal is present). We make the conditional i.i.d. assumption under which observations at the nodes are conditionally independent and identically distributed. We assume that the FC is not compromised, and is able to collect data from all the nodes in the network via error free communication channels. 1 We also assume that the FC does not know which node is Byzantine, but it knows the fraction of Byzantines in the network. 2 We consider the problem of distributed Bayesian detection with prior probabilities of hypotheses known to both the FC and the attacker. The FC aims to minimize the probability of error by choosing the optimal fusion rule.
TABLE I DIFFERENT SCENARIOS BASED ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OPPONENT'S STRATEGIES
Cases Attacker has the knowledge of the FC's strategies FC has the knowledge of Attacker's strategies 
A. Related Work
Although distributed detection has been a very active field of research in the past, security problems in distributed detection networks gained attention only very recently. In [10] , the authors considered the problem of distributed detection in the presence of Byzantines under the NeymanPearson (NP) setup and determined the optimal attacking strategy which minimizes the detection error exponent. This approach based on Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) is analytical tractable and yields approximate results in non-asymptotic cases. They also assumed that the Byzantines know the true hypothesis, which obviously not satisfied in practice but does provide a bound.
In [11] , the authors analyzed the same problem in the context of collaborative spectrum sensing under Byzantine Attacks. They relaxed the assumption of perfect knowledge of the hypotheses by assuming that the Byzantines determine the knowledge about the true hypotheses from their own sensing observations. A variant of the above formulation was explored in [12] , where authors addressed the problem of optimal Byzantine attacks (data falsification) on distributed detection for a tree-based topology and extended the results of [11] for tree topologies. By assuming that the cost of compromising nodes at different levels of the tree is different, they found the optimal Byzantine strategy that minimizes the cost of attacking a given tree. Schemes for Byzantine node identification have been proposed in [11] , [14] [15] [16] .
B. Main Contributions
All the approaches discussed so far consider distributed detection under the Neyman-Pearson (NP) setup. In this paper, we consider the distributed Bayesian detection problems with known prior probabilities of hypotheses. We assume that the Byzantines do not have perfect knowledge about the true state of the phenomenon of interest. In addition, we also assume that the Byzantines neither have the knowledge nor control over the thresholds used to make local decisions at the DRAFT nodes. In other words, the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm of a node are assumed to be the same for every node irrespective of whether they are honest or Byzantines. In contrast to previous works, we focus on providing both asymptotic and non-asymptotic analyses for the Byzantine attacks on distributed Bayesian detection and comparing both of the cases.
First, we show that above a certain fraction of Byzantines in the network, the data fusion scheme becomes completely incapable (blind) and it is not possible to design a decision rule at the FC that can perform better than the decision rule based just on prior information. We find the minimum fraction of Byzantines that can blind the FC and refer to it as the critical power.
Next, we explore the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines under different scenarios.
To gain insight into the degree to which an adversary can cause performance degradation, we first consider the case when the number of nodes is large (asymptotic case). By formulating the problem as that of minimization of Chernoff information, we obtain the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines. Chernoff information is the exponential decay rate of the error probability of the optimal detector. Which is independent of the fusion rule used at the FC.
In practice, the FC and the Byzantines will optimize their utility by choosing their actions based on the knowledge of their opponent's behavior. This motivates us to address the question: what are the optimal attacking/defense strategies given the knowledge of the opponent's strategies? Study of these practically motivated questions requires non asymptotic analysis, which is systematically studied in this work. By assuming the error probability to be our performance metric, we analyze the problem in the non asymptotic regime. Observe that, the probability of error is a function Table I ). It is found that asymptotics-based results do not hold under several non-asymptotic scenarios. More specifically, when the FC does not have knowledge of attacker's strategies, results for the non-asymptotic case are different from those for the asymptotic case. However, if the FC has complete knowledge of the attacker's strategies and uses the optimal fusion rule to make the global decision, results obtained for this case are the same as those for the asymptotic case. Knowledge of the behavior of the attacker in the non-asymptotic regime enables the analysis of many related questions, such as the design of the optimal detector (fusion rule) and effects of strategic interaction between the FC and the attacker. In the process of analyzing the scenario where the FC has complete knowledge of its opponent's strategies, we obtain a closed form expression of the optimal fusion rule. To summarize, our main contributions are threefold.
• In contrast to previous works, we study the problem of distributed detection with Byzantine data in the Bayesian framework.
• We analyze the problem under different attacking scenarios and derive closed form expressions for optimal attacking strategies for both asymptotic and non-asymptotic cases.
• In the process of analyzing the scenario where the FC has complete knowledge of its opponent's strategies, we obtain a closed form expression of the optimal fusion rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our system model, including the Byzantine attack model. In Section III, we provide the closed form expression for the critical power above which the FC becomes blind. In Section IV, we conduct the asymptotic analysis of the distributed Bayesian detection with Byzantine data. Next, we discuss our results based on non-asymptotic analysis of the distributed Bayesian detection system with Byzantine data for different scenarios.
In Section V, we analyze the problem when Byzantines do not have any knowledge about the fusion rule used at the FC. Section VI discusses the scenario where
Byzantines have the knowledge about the fusion rule used at the FC, but the FC does not know the attacker's strategies. Next in Section VII, we extend our analysis to the scenario where both the FC and the attacker have the knowledge of their opponent's strategies and act strategically to optimize their utilities. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper. DRAFT 
II. DISTRIBUTED DETECTION IN THE PRESENCE OF BYZANTINES
Consider two hypotheses H 0 (signal is absent) and H 1 (signal is present). Also, consider a parallel network (see Figure 1 ), comprised of a central entity (known as the Fusion Center (FC)) and a set of N sensors (nodes), which faces the task of determining which of the two hypotheses is true. Prior probabilities of the two hypotheses H 0 and H 1 are denoted by P 0 and P 1 , respectively. The sensors observe the phenomenon, carry out local computations to decide the presence or absence of the phenomenon, and then send their local decisions to the FC that yields a final decision after processing the local decisions. Observations at the nodes are assumed to be conditionally independent and identically distributed. A Byzantine attack on such a system compromises some of the nodes which may then intentionally send falsified local decisions to the FC to make the final decision incorrect. We assume that a fraction α of the N nodes which observe the phenomenon have been compromised by an attacker. We consider the communication channels to be error-free. Next, we describe the modus-operandi of the sensors and the FC in detail.
A. Modus Operandi of the Nodes
Based on the observations, each node i makes a one-bit local decision v i ∈ {0, 1} regarding the absence or presence of the phenomenon using the likelihood ratio test
where λ is the identical threshold 3 used at all the sensors and p
is the conditional probability density function (PDF) of observation y i under the hypothesis H k . Each node i, after making its one-bit local decision v i , sends u i to the FC, where u i = v i if i is an uncompromised (honest) node, but for a compromised (Byzantine) node i, u i need not be equal to v i . We denote the probabilities of detection and false alarm of each node i in the network by P d = P (v i = 1|H 1 ) and P f = P (v i = 1|H 0 ), respectively, which hold for both uncompromised nodes as well as compromised nodes. In this paper, we assume that each Byzantine decides to attack independently relying on its own observation and decision regarding the presence of the phenomenon. Specifically, we define the following strategies P H j,1 , P H j,0 and P B j,1 , P B j,0 (j ∈ {0, 1}) for the honest and Byzantine nodes, respectively:
Byzantine nodes:
where
is the probability that an honest (Byzantine) node sends a to the FC when its actual local decision is b. From now onwards, we will refer to Byzantine flipping probabilities simply by (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ). We also assume that the FC is not aware of the exact set of Byzantine nodes and considers each node i to be Byzantine with a certain probability α.
B. Binary Hypothesis Testing at the Fusion Center
We consider a Bayesian detection problem where the performance criterion at the FC is the probability of error. The FC receives decision vector, u = [u 1 , · · · , u N ], from the nodes and makes the global decision about the phenomenon by considering the maximum a posterior probability (MAP) rule which is given by
DRAFT
Since the u i s are independent of each other, the MAP rule simplifies to a K-out-of-N fusion rule [1] . The global false alarm probability Q F and detection probability Q D are then given by
and
where π j0 and π j1 are the conditional probabilities of u i = j given H 0 and H 1 , respectively.
Specifically, π 1,0 and π 1,1 can be calculated as
where α is the fraction of Byzantine nodes.
The local probability of error as seen by the FC is defined as
and the system wide probability of error at the FC is given by
Notice that, the system wide probability of error P E is a function of the parameter K, which is under the control of the FC, and the parameters (α, P j,0 , P j,1 ) are under the control of the attacker.
The FC and the Byzantines may or may not have knowledge of their opponent's strategy. We will analyze the problem of detection with Byzantine data under these different scenarios in the following sections. First, we will determine the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to blind the decision fusion scheme.
III. CRITICAL POWER TO BLIND THE FUSION CENTER
In this section, we determine the minimum fraction of Byzantine nodes needed to make the FC "blind" and denote it by α blind . We say that the FC is blind if an adversary can make the data that the FC receives from the sensors such that no information is conveyed. In other words, the optimal detector at the FC cannot perform better than simply making the decision based on priors.
Lemma 1: In Bayesian distributed detection, the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to make the FC blind is α blind = 0.5.
Proof:
In the Bayesian framework, we say that the FC is 'blind', if the received data u does not provide any information about the hypotheses to the FC. That is, the condition to make the FC blind can be stated as
It can be seen that (12) is equivalent to
Thus, the FC becomes blind if the probability of receiving a given vector u is independent of the hypothesis present. In such a scenario, the best that the FC can do is to make decisions solely based on the priors, resulting in the most degraded performance at the FC. Now, using the conditional i.i.d. assumption, under which observations at the nodes are conditionally independent and identically distributed, condition (12) to make the FC blind becomes π 1,1 = π 1,0 . This is true only when
Hence, the FC becomes blind if
DRAFT α in (13) is minimized when P 1,0 and P 0,1 both take their largest values, i.e., P 1,0 = P 0,1 = 1.
Hence, α blind = 0.5.
Next, we investigate how the Byzantines can launch an attack optimally considering that the parameter (K) is under the control of the FC. The detection performance at the FC in the presence of the Byzantines, however, cannot be analyzed easily for the non-asymptotic case.
To gain insights into the degree to which an adversary can cause performance degradation, we consider the asymptotic regime, so that error probabilities may be approximated using large deviation analysis.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL BYZANTINE ATTACK
In this section, we look at the asymptotic scenario where the number of nodes in the network is large. In this setting, the asymptotic performance is measured in terms of the Chernoff information [18] . Chernoff information C between two joint distributions of statistically independent, identically distributed random variables is the sum of the marginal Chernoff information C. Since we assume that the nodes' observations are independent, Chernoff information can be expressed as C = N C. From now onwards, we only look at the marginal Chernoff information and refer to it as the Chernoff information, since minimization or maximization of C is equivalent to minimization or maximization of the marginal Chernoff information C.
If u is a random vector having N statistically independent and identically distributed components, u i s, under both hypotheses (π 1,1 , π 1,0 ), the optimal (likelihood ratio) detector results in error probability that obeys the asymptotics
where C is defined as
Using Stein's Lemma, the Chernoff information is the exponential decay rate of the error probability of the optimal detector. In other words, Stein's Lemma suggests that the error probability decays exponentially as the number of nodes increases.
From the Byzantine attacker's point of view, our goal is to find P 1,0 and P 0,1 that minimize DRAFT Chernoff information C for a given value of α. Observe that, when α ≥ 0.5, Chernoff information can be minimized by simply making posterior probabilities equal to prior probabilities (we discuss this in more detail later in the section). However, for α < 0.5, a closed form expression for Chernoff information is needed to find P 1,0 and P 0,1 that minimize C. To obtain the closed form expression of Chernoff information, the solution of an optimization problem is required:
). This is easy to evaluate numerically because ( j∈{0,1} π t j0 π 1−t j1 ) is convex in t. However, obtaining a closed form solution for this optimization problem can be tedious. Fortunately, we can find a closed form expression for the Chernoff information for α < 0.5.
A. Closed Form Expression for the Chernoff Information when α < 0.5
In this subsection, we derive a closed form expression for the Chernoff information, when α < 0.5. 5 Observe that the problem of finding optimal t * in (15) is equivalent to
which is a constrained minimization problem. To find t * , we first perform unconstrained minimization (no constraint on the value of t) and later show that the solution of the unconstrained optimization problem is the same as the solution of the constrained optimization problem. In other words, the optimal t * is the same for both cases.
By observing that logarithm is an increasing function, the optimization problem as given in (16) is equivalent to
Now, performing the first derivative, we have
5 Similar results can be derived for α ≥ 0.5.
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The first derivative (18) is set to zero to find the critical points of the function:
After some simplification, t * which satisfies (19) turns out to be
To determine whether the critical point is a minimum or a maximum, we perform the second derivative test. Since
is greater than zero, t * as given in (20) minimizes (17) . Since 0 ≤ t * ≤ 1 (See proof in Appendix A), t * as given in (20) is also the solution of (16).
B. Minimization of Chernoff Information
First, we minimize Chernoff information for α < 0.5. Later in the section, we generalize our results for any arbitrary α. We formally state the problem as minimize
Since logarithm is an increasing function, Problem P1 is equivalent to the following problem:
where α < 0.5 and t * is as given in (20).
Observe that, maximization ofC is equivalent to the minimization of Chernoff information C. Next, in Lemma 2 we present the properties of Chernoff information C (for the case when α < 0.5) with respect to (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) that enable us to find optimal attacking strategies in this case.
Lemma 2: Let α < 0.5 and assume that the optimal t * is used in the expression for the Chernoff information. Then, the Chernoff information, C, is a monotonically decreasing function of P 1,0 for a fixed P 0,1 . Conversely, the Chernoff information is also a monotonically decreasing function of P 0,1 for a fixed P 1,0 .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Next, using Lemma 2, we present the optimal attacking strategies P 1,0 and P 0,1 that minimize the Chernoff information, C, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Theorem 1:
Optimal attacking strategies, (P * 1,0 , P * 0,1 ), which minimize the Chernoff information are
Proof: The minimum value of C is zero and it occurs when π 1,1 = π 1,0 . By (8) and (9),
From (22), when α ≥ 0.5, the attacker can always find flipping probabilities that make the Chernoff information equal to zero. When α = 0.5, P 1,0 = P 0,1 = 1 is the optimal strategy.
When α > 0.5, any pair which satisfies
is the optimal strategy. However, when α < 0.5, (22) can not be satisfied or in other words Byzantines can not make C = 0 since π 1,1
can not be made equal to π 1,0 . By Lemma 2, when α < 0.5, the optimal attacking strategy,
, that minimizes the Chernoff information is (1, 1).
Next, to gain insight into Theorem 1, we present illustrative examples that corroborate our results.
DRAFT 
C. Illustrative Examples
In Figure 2 (a), we plot the Chernoff information as a function of (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) for (P d = 0.6, P f = 0.4) and α = 0.4. It can be observed that for a fixed P 0,1 (P 1,0 ) the Chernoff information C is a monotonically decreasing function of P 1,0 , P 0,1 (as has been shown in Lemma 2). In other words, when α = 0.4, the attacking strategy, (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ), that minimizes the Chernoff information
Similarly, in Figure 2 (b), we consider the scenario when the fraction of Byzantines in the network is α = 0.8. It can be seen from Figure 2 (b) that the minimum value of the Chernoff information in this case is C = 0. Notice that, the attacking strategy, (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) that makes C = 0 is not unique in this case. It can be verified that any attacking strategy which satisfies In practice, the Byzantine attacker may not have the knowledge about the fusion rule, i.e., the value of K, used by the FC. In such scenarios, we obtain the optimal attacking strategy for Byzantines by maximizing the local probability of error as seen by the FC, which is independent of the fusion rule K. We formally state the problem as maximize
To solve the problem, we analyze the properties of the objective function, P e = P 0 π 1,0 + P 1 (1 − π 1,1 ), with respect to (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ). Notice that
and dP e P 0,1
By utilizing monotonicity properties of the objective function with respect to P 1,0 and P 0,1
( (23) and (24)), we present the solution of the Problem P2 in Table II . For example, when
(which is possible iff P d > P f ), both (23) and (24) are greater than zero. P e then becomes a strictly decreasing function of P 1,0 as well as P 0,1 . Hence, to maximize P e , the attacker needs to choose (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) = (0, 0). Similar arguments lead to the rest of results given in Table II . Note that, if there is an equality in the conditions mentioned in Table II , then the solution will not be unique. For example, dP e P 0,1 = 0
is constant as a function of P 0,1 . In other words, the attacker will be indifferent in choosing the parameter P 0,1 because any value of P 0,1 will result in the same probability of error.
Next, to gain insight into the solution, we present illustrative examples that corroborate our results.
A. Illustrative Examples
In Figure 3 (a), we plot the local probability of error P e as a function of (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) when
We assume that the local probability of detection is P d = 0.8 and the local probability of false alarm is P f = 0.1 such that
2222, and
and it implies that the optimal attacking strategy is (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) = (1, 1), which can be verified from Figure 3 (a).
In Figure 3 (b), we study the local probability of error P e as a function of the attacking strategy (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) when (P 0 = 0.1, P 1 = 0.9). We assume that the local probability of detection is P d = 0.8 and the local probability of false alarm is P f = 0.1 such that
.2222, and
implies that the optimal attacking strategy is (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) = (0, 1), which can be verified from the Figure 3(b) . These results corroborate our DRAFT theoretical results presented in Table II. In the next section, we investigate the scenario where Byzantines are aware of the fusion rule K used at the FC and can use this knowledge to provide false information in an optimal manner to blind the FC. However, the FC does not have knowledge of Byzantine's attacking strategies (α, P j,0 , P j,1 ) and does not optimize against Byzantine's behavior. Since majority rule is a widely used fusion rule in non-adversarial scenarios [19] , we assume that the FC uses the majority rule to make the global decision.
VI. OPTIMAL BYZANTINE ATTACKING STRATEGIES WITH KNOWLEDGE OF MAJORITY FUSION RULE
In this section, we investigate optimal Byzantine attacking strategies in a distributed detection system, with the attacker having knowledge about the fusion rule used at the FC. However, we assume that the FC is not strategic in nature, and uses a majority rule, without trying to optimize against the Byzantine's behavior. We consider both the FC and the Byzantine to be strategic in Section VII. The performance criterion at the FC is assumed to be the probability of error P E .
For a fixed fusion rule (K * ), which, as mentioned before, is assumed to be the majority rule
, P E varies with the parameters (α, P j,0 , P j,1 ) which are under the control of the attacker. The Byzantine attack problem can be formally stated as follows:
For a fixed fraction of Byzantines α, the attacker wants to maximize the probability of error P E by choosing its attacking strategy (P j,0 , P j,1 ) optimally. We assume that the attacker is aware of the fact that the FC is using the majority rule for making the global decision. Before presenting our main results for Problem P3, we make an assumption that will be used in the theorem.
Assumption 1:
We assume that α < min{(0.
> 0.5, suggests that as N tends to infinity, m = N 2N − 2 tends to 0.5. When P d tends to 1 and P f tends to 0, the above condition becomes α < 0.5.
A consequence of this assumption is π 1,1 > m, which can be shown as follows. By (9), we have
Eq. (25) is true because α < min{(0.
Another consequence of this assumption is π 1,0 < 0.5, which can be shown as follows. From (8), we have
Eq. (26) is true because α < min{(0.
Next, we analyze the properties of P E with respect to (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) under our assumption that enable us to find the optimal attacking strategies.
Lemma 3: Assume that the FC employs the majority fusion rule K * and α < min{(0.5 −
. Then, for any fixed value of P 0,1 , the error probability P E at the FC is a quasi-convex function of P 1,0 .
Proof: A function f (P 1,0 ) is quasi-convex if, for some P * 1,0 , f (P 1,0 ) is non-increasing for P 1,0 ≤ P * 1,0 and f (P 1,0 ) is non-decreasing for P 1,0 ≥ P * 1,0 . In other words, the lemma is proved if dP E dP 1,0 ≤ 0 (or dP E dP 1,0 ≥ 0) for all P 1,0 , or if for some P * 1,0 , dP E dP 1,0 ≤ 0 when P 1,0 ≤ P * 1,0 and dP E dP 1,0 ≥ 0 when P 1,0 ≥ P * 1,0 . First, we calculate the partial derivative of P E with respect to P 1,0 for an arbitrary K as follows:
The detailed derivation of dP E dP 1,0 is given in Appendix D and we present a summary of the main DRAFT results below.
dP E dP 1,0 given in (30) can be reformulated as follows:
and r (P 1,0 , K, α) = ln P 0 P 1
It can be seen that g (P 1,0 , K, α) ≥ 0 so that the sign of
depends only on the value of r (P 1,0 , K, α). To prove that P E is a quasi-convex function of P 1,0 when the majority rule K * is used at the FC, it is sufficient to show that r (P 1,0 , K * , α) is a non-decreasing function.
Differentiating r (P 1,0 , K * , α) with respect to P 1,0 , we get
It can be shown that dr (P 1,0 , K * , α) dP 1, 0 > 0 (see Appendix C) and this completes the proof.
Quasi-convexity of P E over P 1,0 implies that the maximum of the function occurs on the corners, i.e., P 1,0 = 0 or 1 (may not be unique). Next, we analyze the properties of P E with respect to P 0,1 .
Lemma 4:
Assume that the FC employs the majority fusion rule K * and α < min{(0.5 −
. Then, the probability of error P E at the FC is a quasiconvex function of P 0,1 for a fixed P 1,0 .
Proof: For a fixed P 1,0 , we have
By a similar argument as given in Appendix D, for an arbitrary K we have
dP E dP 0,1 given in (36) can be reformulated as follows:
and r (P 0,1 , K, α) = ln
It can be seen that g (P 0,1 , K, α) ≥ 0 such that the sign of dP E dP 0,1 depends on the value of r (P 0,1 , K, α). To prove that P E is a quasi-convex function of P 1,0 when the majority rule K * is used at the FC, it is sufficient to show that r (P 0,1 , K * , α) is a non-decreasing function.
Differentiating r (P 0,1 , K * , α) with respect to P 0,1 , we get
In the following, we show that
i.e., r (P 0,1 , K * , α) is non-decreasing. It is sufficient to show that
First, we consider the case when there are an even number of nodes in the network and majority fusion rule is given by
Using the fact that
, and K * = N 2 + 1, (44) becomes
Next, we consider the case when there are odd number of nodes in the network and majority fusion rule is given by K * = N + 1 2 . By using the fact that
, it can be seen that the right-hand side of (45) is nonnegative. Hence, from (45), we have
This completes our proof.
Theorem 2: (1, 0), (0, 1), or (1, 1) are the optimal attacking strategies (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) that maximize the probability of error P E , when the majority fusion rule is employed at the FC and
Proof: Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 suggest that one of the corners is the maximum of P E because of quasi-convexity. Note that (0, 0) cannot be the solution of the maximization problem since the attacker does not flip any results. Hence, we end up with three possibilities: (1, 0), (0, 1), or (1, 1).
Next, to gain insights into Theorem 2, we present illustrative examples that corroborate our results. DRAFT 
A. Illustrative Examples
In Figure 4 (a), we plot the probability of error P E as a function of the attacking strategy (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) for even number of nodes, N = 10, in the network. We assume that the probability of detection is P d = 0.8, the probability of false alarm is P f = 0.1, prior probabilities are (P 0 = 0.4, P 1 = 0.6), and α = 0.37. Since α < min{(0.5−P f ), (1−(m/P d ))}, where m = N 2N −2 , quasi-convexity can be observed in Figure 4(a) . Figure 4 (b) shows probability of error P E as a function of attacking strategy (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) for odd number of nodes, N = 11, in the network.
Similarly, quasi-convexity can be observed in Figure 4 Observe that the results obtained for this case are not the same as the results obtained for the asymptotic case. This is because the asymptotic performance measure (i.e., Chernoff information) is the exponential decay rate of the error probability of the "optimal detector". In other words, while optimizing over Chernoff information, we implicitly assumed that the optimal fusion rule is used at the FC.
Next, we investigate the case where the FC has the knowledge of attacker's strategies and uses the optimal fusion rule K * to make the global decision. Here, the attacker tries to maximize its worst case probability of error min K P E by choosing (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) optimally.
VII. OPTIMAL BYZANTINE ATTACKING STRATEGIES WITH STRATEGY-AWARE FC
In this section, we analyze the scenario where the FC has the knowledge of attacker's strategies and uses the optimal fusion rule K * to make the global decision. The Byzantine attack problem can be formally stated as follows:
where K * is the optimal fusion rule. In other words, K * is the best response of the FC to the Byzantine attacking strategies. Next, we find the expression for the optimal fusion rule K * used DRAFT at the FC.
A. Optimal Fusion Rule
First, we design the optimal fusion rule assuming that the local sensor threshold λ and the Byzantine attacking strategy (α, P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) are fixed and known to the FC.
Lemma 5: For a fixed local sensor threshold λ and α < 1 P 0,1 + P 1,0 , the optimal fusion rule is given by
Proof: Consider the maximum a posterior probability (MAP) rule
Since the u i s are independent of each other, the MAP rule simplifies to
Let us assume that K * out of N nodes send u i = 1. Now, the above equation can be written as
Taking logarithms on both sides of the above equation, we have
where (47) follows from the fact that, for π 1,1 > π 1,0 or equivalently, α < 1
DRAFT The probability of false alarm Q F and the probability of detection Q D for this case are as given in (6) and (7) with K = K * . Next, we present our results for the case when the fraction of Byzantines α > 1 P 0,1 + P 1,0 .
Lemma 6: For a fixed local sensor threshold λ and α > 1 P 0,1 + P 1,0 , the optimal fusion rule is given by
Proof: This can be proved similarly as Lemma 5 and using the fact that, for π 1,1 < π 1,0 or equivalently, α > 1
The probability of false alarm Q F and the probability of detection Q D for this case can be calculated to be
Next, we analyze the property of P E with respect to Byzantine attacking strategy (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) that enables us to find the optimal attacking strategies.
Lemma 7: For a fixed local sensor threshold λ, assume that the FC employs the optimal fusion rule K * , 7 as given in (46). Then, for α ≤ 0.5, the error probability P E at the FC is a monotonically increasing function of P 1,0 while P 0,1 remains fixed. Conversely, the error probability P E at the FC is a monotonically increasing function of P 0,1 while P 1,0 remains fixed.
Proof: Observe that, for a fixed λ, P E ( K * ) is a continuous but not a differentiable function.
However, the function is non differentiable only at a finite number (or infinitely countable number) of points because of the nature of K * . Now observe that, for a fixed fusion rule
Utilizing this fact, to show that the lemma is true, we first find the condition that a fusion rule K should satisfy so that P E is a monotonically increasing function of P 1,0 while keeping P 0,1 fixed (and vice versa) and later show that K * satisfies this condition. 7 Notice that, K * might not be an integer.
From (31), finding those K that satisfy dP E dP 1,0 > 0 8 is equivalent to finding those value of K that make
Similarly, we can find the condition that a fusion rule K should satisfy so that P E is a monotonically increasing function of P 0,1 while keeping P 1,0 fixed. From (37), finding those K that satisfy dP E dP 0,1 > 0 is equivalent to finding those K that make
From (51) and (52), we have
Next, we show that the optimal fusion rule K * given in (46) is within the region (A, B). First 8 Observe that, for α < 0.5, the function g (P1,0, K * , α) = 0 (as given in (32)) only under extreme conditions (i.e., P1 = 0 or P d = 0 or P d = 1). Ignoring these extreme conditions, we have g (P1,0, K * , α) > 0.
Since P d > P f , to prove (54) we start from the inequality
Now, we show that A > K * . Observe that,
Hence, it is sufficient to show that
1 > K * − K * is true from the property of the ceiling function. By (83), we have
which completes the proof.
Based on Lemma 7, we present the optimal attacking strategies for the case when the FC has the knowledge regarding the strategies used by the Byzantines.
Theorem 3:
The optimal attacking strategies, (P * 1,0 , P * 0,1 ), which maximize the probability of DRAFT error, P E ( K * ), are given by
where (p 1,0 , p 0,1 ) satisfies α(p 1,0 + p 0,1 ) = 1.
Proof: Note that, the maximum probability of error occurs when the posterior probabilities are equal to the prior probabilities of the hypotheses. That is,
Now using the result from (13), the condition can be simplified to
Eq. (56) suggests that when α ≥ 0.5, the attacker can find flipping probabilities that make P E = min{P 0 , P 1 }. When α = 0.5, P 1,0 = P 0,1 = 1 is the optimal attacking strategy and when α > 0.5, any pair which satisfies P 1,0 + P 0,1 = 1 α is optimal. However, when α < 0.5, (56) cannot be satisfied. In this case, by Lemma 7, for α < 0.5, (1, 1) is an optimal attacking strategy, (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ), which maximizes probability of error, P E ( K * ).
Next, to gain insight into Theorem 3, we present illustrative examples that corroborate our results.
B. Illustrative Examples
In Figure 5 , we plot the minimum probability of error as a function of attacker's strategy (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ), where P E is minimized over all possible fusion rules K. We consider a N = 11 node network, with the nodes' detection and false alarm probabilities being 0.6 and 0.4, respectively.
Prior probabilities are assumed to be P 0 = 0.4 and P 1 = 0.6. Observe that, the optimal fusion rule as given in (46) changes with attacker's strategy (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ). Thus, the minimum probability of error min K P E is a non-differentiable function. It is evident from Figure 5 (a) that (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) = (1, 1) maximizes the probability of error, P E ( K * ). This corroborates our theoretical results presented in Theorem 3, that for α < 0.5, the optimal attacking strategy, (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ), that maximizes the probability of error, P E ( K * ), is (1, 1).
In Figure 5 (b) we consider the scenario where α = 0.8 (i.e., α > 0.5). It can be seen that the attacking strategy (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ), that maximizes min K P E is not unique in this case. It can be verified that any attacking strategy which satisfies P 1,0 + P 0,1 = 1 0.8 will make min K P E = min{P 0 , P 1 } = 0.4. This corroborates our theoretical results presented in Theorem 3.
Observe that the results obtained for this case are consistent with the results obtained for the asymptotic case. This is because the optimal fusion rule is used at the FC and the asymptotic performance measure (i.e., Chernoff information) is the exponential decay rate of error probability of the "optimal detector", and thus, implicitly assumes that the optimal fusion rule is used at the FC.
When the attacker does not have the knowledge of the fusion rule K used at the FC, from an attacker's perspective, maximizing its local probability of error P e is the optimal attacking strategy. The optimal attacking strategy in this case is either of the four possibilities: (P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) = (0, 0) or (0, 1) or (1, 0) or (1, 1) (see Table II ). However, the FC has knowledge of the attacking strategy (α, P 1,0 , P 0,1 ) and thus, uses the optimal fusion rule as given in (46) and (48).
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We considered the problem of distributed Bayesian detection with Byzantine data, and characterized the power of attack analytically. For distributed detection under binary hypotheses, the expressions of the minimum attacking power above which the ability to detect is completely destroyed was obtained. We showed that when there are more than 50% of Byzantines in the network, the data fusion scheme becomes blind and no detector can achieve any performance DRAFT gain over the one based just on priors. The optimal attacking strategies for Byzantines that degrade the performance at the FC were obtained. Both, asymptotic and non-asymptotic cases were considered. It was shown that the results obtained for the non-asymptotic case are consistent with the results obtained for the asymptotic case only when the FC has the knowledge of the attacker's strategies, and thus, uses the optimal fusion rule. However, results obtained for the non- First, we show that t * ≤ 1. We start from the following equality:
By applying the logarithm inequality 1 − 1 x < ln(x) < (x − 1), ∀x > 0, to (57), we have
Next, we show that t * ≥ 0. First we prove that the denominator of t * is nonnegative. Since π 1,1 > π 1,0 for P d > P f and α < 0.5, we have
Next we prove that the numerator of t * is also nonnegative, and then t * is nonnegative. We start from the following equality:
By applying the logarithm inequality 1 − 1 x < ln(x) < (x − 1), ∀x > 0, to (61), we have
To show that, for the optimal t * and α < 0.5, Chernoff information, C, is monotonically decreasing function of P 1,0 while keeping P 0,1 fixed is equivalent to showing thatC, is monotonically increasing function of P 1,0 while keeping P 0,1 fixed. Differentiating both sides ofC with respect to P 1,0 , we get
In the above equation, π 1,1 ) ) and
.
Let us denote a
monotonically increasing function of P 1,0 while keeping P 0,1 fixed if
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (c 1 − c 2 ) = 0 as given in (19) .
In other words,
Similarly, for the optimal t * and α < 0.5, Chernoff information, C, is monotonically decreasing function of P 0,1 while keeping
which is equivalent to show that,
Furthermore, (64) can be simplified to
Combining (63) and (65), the condition to make Lemma 2 true becomes
Using the result from (19), the above equation can be written as
, we get
After some simplification the above condition can be written as
Notice that, in the above equation
or equivalently
. The second inequality in (68) follows from the fact that ln
. Using logarithm inequality, we have ln
. Similarly, to show that the second inequality in (68) is true we show ln
Using these results we can then write (67) in the form below,
Similarly, the left hand side inequality in (66) can be written as,
DRAFT Using the results from (19), the above equation can be written as,
After some simplification the above condition can be written as,
Using (68), the condition can be written as
Now from (69) and (70), Lemma 2 is true if
Next we show that, the optimal t * is with in the region (A, B) . Using the results from (84), we start from the inequality
, then the above condition can be written as,
Next, we use the log inequality,
, ∀x > 0, to derive further results. Let us focus our attention to the left hand side inequality in (72)
Now, let us focus our attention to the right hand side inequality in (72)
Now using the results from (73) and (74), we can deduce that
which is true from the fact that for a > 0, b > 0, 1 1 + a < 1 1 + b iff b < a. Next, observe that, t * as given in (20) can be written as Which along with (75) implies that
or in other words, A < t * < B. This completes our proof.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF dr (P 1,0 , K * , α) dP 1, 0 > 0 Differentiating both sides of r (P 1,0 , K * , α) with respect to P 1,0 , we get dr (P 1,0 , K * , α) dP 1, 0 = (K * − 1)α 1 − P f π 1,0
In the following we show that dr (P 1,0 , K * , α) dP 1,0 > 0
i.e., r (P 1,0 , K * , α) is non-decreasing. Observe that in the above equation,
To show that the above condition is true, we start from the inequality
⇔ αP 1,0 + (1 − P 0,1 α)
Similarly, it can be shown that
Now from (77) and (84), to show that dr (P 1,0 , K * , α) dP 1, 0 > 0 is equivalent to show that
Next, we consider two different cases, first when there are odd number of nodes in the network and second when there are even number of nodes in the network.
DRAFT
Odd Number of Nodes: When there are odd number of nodes in the network, the majority fusion rule is K * = (N + 1)/2. In this case (85) is equivalent to show that N − 1 2
To show that the above condition is true, we start from the following inequality
Since 1 − P f 1 − P d > 1, π 1,0 < 0.5 (consequence of our assumption) and N ≥ 2, the above condition is equivalent to
which implies that dr (P 1,0 , K * , α) dP 1, 0 > 0 for odd number of nodes case. Next, we consider the even number of nodes case.
Even Number of Nodes: Now, we consider the case when there are even number of nodes in the network and majority fusion rule is given by K * = N 2 + 1. Condition (85) is equivalent to show that
Which follows from the fact that
and the result given in (86). This completes our proof.
DRAFT APPENDIX D CALCULATING PARTIAL DERIVATIVE OF P E W.R.T. P 1,0
First, we calculate the partial derivative of Q F with respect to P 1,0 . Notice that,
where π 1,0 = α(P 1,0 (1 − P f ) + (1 − P 0,1 )P f ) + (1 − α)P f (89) (π 1,0 ) = dπ 1,0 /dP 1,0 = α(1 − P f ).
Differentiating both sides of (88) with respect to P 1,0 , we get Similarly, the partial derivative of Q D w.r.t. P 1,0 can calculated to be
